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ABSTRACT
Many analysis and machine learning tasks require the availability
of marginal statistics on multidimensional datasets while providing
strong privacy guarantees for the data subjects. Applications for
these statistics range from finding correlations in the data to fitting
sophisticated prediction models. In this paper, we provide a set of
algorithms for materializing marginal statistics under the strong
model of local differential privacy. We prove the first tight theo-
retical bounds on the accuracy of marginals compiled under each
approach, perform empirical evaluation to confirm these bounds,
and evaluate them for tasks such as modeling and correlation test-
ing. Our results show that releasing information based on (local)
Fourier transformations of the input is preferable to alternatives
based directly on (local) marginals.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern data-driven applications must guarantee a high level of
privacy to their users if they are to gain widespread acceptance. The
current de facto standard for privacy is differential privacy, which
imposes a statistical requirement on the output of a data release
process. Considerable effort has been invested into achieving this
guarantee while maximizing the fidelity of the released information,
typically with the assistance of a centralized trusted third party
who aggregates the data. However, there is growing importance
placed on algorithms which dispense with the trusted aggregator,
and instead allow each participant to ensure that the information
that they reveal already meets the differential privacy guarantee in
isolation. This gives the local differential privacy (LDP) model.
The model of Local Differential Privacy combines the statistical
guarantees of differential privacy with a further promise to the user:
their information is never visible to anyone else in its raw form,
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Table 1: Attributes of NYC taxi dataset
Attribute Explanation
CC Has customer paid using credit card?
Toll Has customer paid toll?
Far Is journey distance ≥ 10 miles?
Night_pick Is pickup time ≥ 8 PM?
Night_drop Is drop off time ≤3 AM?
M_pick Is trip origin within Manhattan?
M_drop Is trip destination within Manhattan?
Tip Is tip paid ≥ 25% of the total fare?
Trip/Attributes M_pick M_drop CC Tip . . .
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2 N Y Y N . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. Y N Y N . . .
Figure 1: Trip Data
M_pick/M_drop Y N
Y 0.55 0.15
N 0.10 0.20
Figure 2: 2-way marginal
and they retain “plausible deniability” of any sensitive information
associated with them. Local differential privacy has been adopted
in Google Chrome via the RAPPOR tool to collect browing and
system statistics [18], and in Apple’s iOS 10 to collect app usage
statistics [2]. It is consequently already deployed for information
gathering over a user base of hundreds of millions of people. So far,
work in the LDP model has focused on relatively simple computa-
tions: collecting basic frequency statistics about one dimensional
data (e.g. identifying popular destinations on the web). But this
one-dimensional view of the world does not capture the rich set of
correlations that real data exhibits, as in the following case study.
Motivating example: movement patterns. Consider the collec-
tion and release of statistics on movement patterns of individual’s.
Each trip is a multidimensional object, including origin and destina-
tion, timings, tip, and mode of payment. All of these should be con-
sidered private, as they can potentially be used to determine an in-
dividual’s work/home locations, social habits and lifestyle. Figure 1
shows an example taxi trip dataset, where each journey is described
in terms of a number of (binary) attributes. “Anonymized” taxi trip
data from New York City still made it possible to stalk celebrities,
identify drivers doing good business, and infer home/work loca-
tions of frequent visitors to adult entertainment clubs. However,
there are many positive potential uses of this type of data when it is
represented as statistical marginal tables. Put simply, a marginal ta-
ble records the (empirical) probability distribution between a set of
attributes. A taxi service provider could learn more about the travel
needs, habits and preferences of customers in a particular market,
e.g. which areas are most popular during the night versus during the
day. We would want to test the validity of any correlations found
by subjecting them to statistical hypothesis tests. Beyond just find-
ing correlations, we may be interested in more complex analysis
such as describing the probabilistic relationship between cause and
effects by modeling features as a Bayesian Network. This could
help to predict demand in different areas at different times, reduce
customer waiting times, and provide expected revenues. It could
even infer customer satisfaction with different drivers by compar-
ing average tip amounts across collections of comparable journeys.
Such graphical models rely on the computation of conditional prob-
ability tables (CPTs), which are derived directly from marginals.
All these tasks can be accomplished given information about the
population-level correlations between particular combinations of
attributes, which can be derived from the marginal distributions be-
tween small numbers of attributes–typically, two-way or three-way
marginals suffice. Figure 2 shows a marginal table which confirms
that most trips are short and originated and terminated within the
Manhattan region and shows strong degree of correlation between
pickup and drop off locations. Consequently, our objective is to
allow such tables to be computed accurately on demand from data
collected privately from a large user population. □
Thus, the contingency, or marginal, table is “the workhorse of
data analysis” [4]. These statistics are important in and of them-
selves for understanding the data distribution, and identifying
which attributes are correlated. They are also used for query plan-
ning and approximate query answering within database systems. A
variety of fundamental inference and machine learning tasks also
rely on accurate marginals capturing the correlations. E.g. many
algorithms in statistical language modeling/predictive text [26] and
association rule mining (market basket analysis) compute low order
marginals as a preprocessing step. Furthermore, for multivariate
distributions where direct sampling is infeasible or too costly, low
dimensional marginals serve as building blocks [9, 29] to compute
accurate approximations. Hence, we identify low-order (2-way and
3-way) marginals as our main focus.
It is therefore not surprising that much work on private data
analysis has studied the problem of materializing and releasing
marginals while achieving some privacy guarantee. It is clear that
the information described by marginals is potentially very sensitive,
as it collates and reveals information about individuals. A canonical
example of privacy leakage is when a cell in a marginal table refers
to just one person or a few individuals, and allows the value of
an attribute to be inferred. For instance, a marginal table relating
salary and zip code can reveal an individual’s income level when
they are the sole high earner in a region. While this problem has
been well-studied under centralized differential privacy, when we
desire to protect individuals under the stronger model of local DP,
there is limited prior work ([20] for 2-way marginals); in this paper,
we seek to give strong guarantees for arbitrary marginals.
Our Contributions. In this work, we provide a general framework
for marginal release under LDP, with theoretical and empirical
analysis. First, we review prior work (Section 2), and provide back-
ground on methods to support private marginal release (Section 3).
We describe a set of new algorithms that give unbiased estimators
for marginals, which vary on fundamental design choices such as
whether to release information about each marginal in turn, or
about the whole joint distribution; and whether to release statis-
tics directly about the tables, or to give derived statistics based on
(Fourier) transforms of the data. For each combination, we argue
that it meets the LDP guarantee, and provide an accuracy guarantee
in terms of the privacy parameter ϵ , population size N , and also the
dimensionality of the data,d , and target marginals, k (Section 4). We
perform experimental comparison to augment the theoretical under-
standing in Section 5, focusing mostly on the low-degree marginals
that are of most value. Across a range of data dimensionalities and
marginal sizes, the most effective techniques are based on working
in the Fourier (Hadamard) transform space, which capture more
information per user than methods working directly in the data
space. The use of Hadamard transform for materializing marginals
was considered by early work in the centralized differential pri-
vacy model, but has fallen from favor in the centralized model,
supplanted by more involved privacy mechanisms [12, 23, 39]. We
observe that these other mechanisms do not easily translate to
the local model. Concurrent with the development of this work,
the Hadamard basis has found application in protocols for LDP
frequency estimation [10]. There, incorporating the transform pre-
serves the accuracy guarantees, while reducing the communication
cost. In our setting, we show that the transform can both improve
accuracy and reduce communication cost. The endpoint of our
evaluation is the application of our methods to two use-cases: build-
ing a Bayesian model of the data, and testing statistical significance
of correlations. These confirm that in practice the Hadamard-based
approach is preferable and the most scalable in terms of communi-
cation and computation cost. We summarize the results in Table 2.
Our methods are eminently suitable for implementation in existing
LDP deployments (Chrome, iOS) for gathering correlation statistics.
2 RELATEDWORK
Differential Privacy (DP) [13, 15, 16], unlike its precursor privacy
definitions, provides semantic mathematical promises on individ-
uals’ privacy, interpreted as statistical properties of the output
distribution of a randomized algorithm. Formally, an algorithm A
meets the ϵ-DP guarantee if, over pairs of inputs D,D ′ that differ
in the presence of a single individual, its output A(D) satisfies
Pr[A(D) = x]
Pr[A(D ′) = x] ≤ exp(ϵ), (1)
where x is any permitted output. The model has risen in popularity
and adoption compared to earlier attempts to codify privacy (such
as k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity [30, 37]), which can leak sensitive
information. It has been a topic of inquiry for diverse research
communities including theory [40], datamanagement [31], machine
learning [38], and systems/programming languages [33]. We focus
on two directions: the emergent model of local differential privacy
(Section 2.1), and private marginal release (Section 2.2).
2.1 Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
Initial work on differential privacy assumed the participation of a
trusted aggregator, who curates the private information of individu-
als, and releases information through a DP algorithm. In practice,
individuals may be reluctant to share private information with the
central data curator. Local differential privacy instead captures the
case when each user independently (but collaboratively) releases
information on their input through an instance of a DP algorithm.
This model was first suggested by Evfimievski et al. [19] under the
name of γ -amplification, with an application to mining association
rules. Duchi et al. [14] studied a generalization of that model as
a local version of DP, and proposed a minimax framework with
information theoretic bounds on utility.
The canonical LDP algorithm is randomized response (RR), first
developed in the context of survey design in the 1960s [42]. Users
who possess a private bit of information flip it with some prob-
ability p to have plausible deniability of their response. Collect-
ing enough responses shared through this mechanism allows an
accurate estimate of the population behavior to be formed. Ran-
domized response is at the heart of many recent LDP algorithms,
most famously Google’s deployment of RAPPOR [18], where RR
is applied to a Bloom filter encoding a large set of possible URLs.
In a follow-up paper, Fanti et al. [20] extend RAPPOR’s ability to
identify strings which are frequent across the user distribution,
building them up piece by piece. However, their solution is some-
what specific to RAPPOR’s case and does not offer any guarantee on
the accuracy. Apple’s implementation uses sketching to reduce the
dimensionality of a massive domain [2, 5, 10]. Microsoft telemetry
data collection involves rounding and memoization technique for
periodic measurement of app usage statistics under LDP [11].
There is a growing theoretical understanding of LDP. Kairouz et
al. [27, 28] study how to estimate the frequency of a single categor-
ical attribute, and propose optimal generalizations of randomized
response. Closest to our interest is work on generating a histogram
under LDP, or identifying the peaks in the input (heavy hitters).
This can be viewed as the problem of estimating a one-dimensional
marginal distribution. The state of art asymptotic lower bound and
matching algorithm are due to Bassily and Smith [6]. They adapt
ideas from dimensionality reduction (i.e. the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
lemma) to build a primitive to estimate the weight of a single point
in the distribution; this is used to find all heavy hitters. Qin et al.
adapt this approach to the related problem of identifying heavy
hitters within set valued data [36]; Chen et al. use it on spatial
data to build user movement models under LDP [8]. Wang et al.
describe optimizations that consider asymmetric randomized re-
sponse and hashing to reduce variance [41]. We apply some of these
methods in our setting in Appendix B.2, but find that they do not
scale to the range of input dimensions that we consider. Nguyên et
al. describe a general approach for data analysis under LDP with
multiple rounds [34]. They propose an orthogonal measurement
basis isomorphic to the Hadamard transform, but only for 1D data.
2.2 Publishing Marginals Privately
Marginal tables arise in many places throughout data processing.
For example, an OLAP datacube is the collection of all possible
marginals of a data set. Consequently, there has been much work
to release individual marginals or collections of marginals under
privacy guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, these all assume
the trusted aggregator model. The motivations for these algorithms
— accurate statistics collection, data analysis, model building etc. —
are just as compelling under the model of LDP which removes the
trusted aggregator. We discuss a representative set of approaches,
and whether they can be applied under LDP.
Laplace Noise. The baseline for differential privacy is the sensi-
tivity and noise approach: we bound (over all possible inputs) the
“sensitivity” of a target query in terms of the amount by which the
output can vary as a function of the input. Adding noise from an
appropriate distribution (typically Laplace) calibrated by the sen-
sitivity guarantees privacy. This approach transfers to LDP fairly
smoothly, since the sensitivity of a single marginal on N users is
easy to bound by O(1/N ) [15]. A variant is to apply this to a trans-
formation of the data, such as a wavelet or Fourier transform [4, 43].
Our contribution is to refine and analyze how to release marginals
via transformations under the related guarantee of LDP.
SubsetMarginal Selection.When the objective is to release many
marginals — say, the entire data cube — the above approach shows
its limitations, since the sensitivity, and hence the scale of the noise
grows exponentially with the number of dimensions: 2d . Ding et
al. [12] compute low dimensional marginals by aggregating high
dimensional marginals, chosen via a constrained optimization prob-
lem and a greedy approximation. This solution does not translate
naturally to LDP, since each user has access to only her record and
may come up with a different subset locally compared to others.
MultiplicativeWeights. Several approaches use themultiplicative
weight update method to iteratively pick an output distribution [22–
24]. For concreteness, we describe a non-adaptive approach due to
Hardt et al. [23]. The method initializes a candidate output uniform
marginal, and repeatedly modifies it so that it is a better fit for
the data. To ensure DP, it uses the exponential mechanism [32] to
sample a k-way marginal whose projection at a certain point in the
true data is far from the corresponding value for the candidate. The
candidate is then scaled multiplicatively to reduce the discrepancy.
The sampling and rescaling step is repeated multiple times, and the
convergence properties are analyzed. The number of steps must be
limited, as the “privacy budget” must be spread out over all steps
to give an overall privacy guarantee. Applying the exponential
mechanism in this way does not obviously extend to the LDPmodel.
In particular, every user’s single input is almost equally far from
any candidate distribution, so it is hard to coordinate the sampling
to ensure that the process converges. A natural implementation
would have many rounds of communication, whereas we focus on
solutions where each user generates a single output without further
coordination.
Chebyshev polynomials. Thaler et al. view a dataset as a linear
function on marginals, and represent each record of a dataset via
a γ -accurate Chebyshev polynomial [39], whose coefficients can
be perturbed for privacy. This is intended to be faster than multi-
plicative weights solutions which must range over an O(2d )-sized
representation of the data. This approach could plausibly be adapted
to LDP, although the steps required are far from immediate.
In summary, the LDP requirement to perturb elements of every
single record independently (which are sparse in our case) while
preserving the underlying correlations is not yet met by prior work,
and so we must give new algorithms and analyses.
3 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In line with prior work [4], our main focus is on data represented by
binary variables. This helps to keep the notation uniform, and high-
lights the key challenges. We discuss the modifications necessary
to accommodate more general attributes in Section 7.
In our setting, each user i has a has a private bit vector ji ∈
{0, 1}d that represents the values of the d (sensitive) attributes for
i . It is often more convenient to view the user’s data instead as an
indicator vector ti of length 2d with 1 at exactly one place ji and
0’s at remaining positions. The domain of all such ti ’s is the set of
identity basis vectors I2d×2d . This ‘unary’ view of user data allows
us to model the full contingency table correspondingly as a vector
(histogram) of length 2d with each cell indexed by η ∈ {0, 1}d
storing the count of all individuals with that exact combination of
attribute values. This encoding is also called one hot encoding.
An untrusted aggregator (e.g. a pollster) is interested in gathering
information on these attributes from the population of users. Un-
der the LDP model, the aggregator is not allowed (on legal/ethical
grounds) to collect any user i’s records in plain form. The gathered
data should allow running queries (e.g. the fraction of users that
use product A,B but notC together) over the interaction of at most
k ≤ d attributes. We do not assume that there is a fixed set of
queries known a priori. Rather, we allow arbitrary such queries
to be posed over the collected data. Our goal is to allow the accu-
rate reconstruction of k-way marginal tables under LDP. We now
formalize Local Differential Privacy (Section 3.1), and introduce
examples and notation for computing marginals (Section 3.2).
3.1 Local Differential Privacy
Local differential privacy (LDP) requires each data owner to per-
turb their output to meet the DP guarantee. Any two tuples ti , t ′i ∈I2d×2d are considered adjacent, with | |ti − t ′i | |1 = 2 i.e. ti , t ′i are
adjacent if they differ in their positions of 1’s. LDP upper bounds
the ratio of probabilities of seeing the same outcome for all adja-
cent tuples. The definition is obtained by applying the differential
privacy definition of equation (1) to a single user’s data.
Definition 3.1 (ϵ-local differential privacy (LDP) [14]). A random-
ized mechanism F is differentially private with parameter ϵ iff for
all pairs of adjacent input tuples ti , t ′i ∈ I2d×2d , and every possible
output tuple R (k ≤ d), we have
Pr[F (ti ) = R] ≤ eϵ Pr[F (t ′i ) = R] (2)
When we aggregate in the LDP model, the above definition
ensures that we cannot confidently distinguish whether R is an
outcome of F (ti ) or F (t ′i ), yielding plausible deniability to user i .
Note that in LDP each user does reveal their presence in the input.
The model allows each user to operate with a different privacy
parameter, but for simplicity we state our results using a value of ϵ
which is shared by all users (in common with other work on LDP).
Basic Private Mechanisms. We describe primitives for LDP on
simple inputs, which form building blocks for our protocols.
Randomized Response (RR):We first formally define the classic mech-
anism for releasing a single bit bi under privacy by having the user
lie with some probability [7]. In its simplest form, randomized
response has each user i report the true value of their input (bi )
with probability pr > 12 . Otherwise, i gives the opposite response
(1 − bi ). It is immediate that RR admits differential privacy with
eϵ =
pr
1−pr , by considering the probabilities of the four combina-
tions of input and output. Its simplicity has made it popular in
practical systems [2, 18, 34].
Budget Splitting (BS) and Randomized Response with Sampling (RRS):
When each user holdsm pieces of information, a first approach is
to release information about allm via a mechanism that achieves
(ϵ/m)-LDP on each, thus effectively splitting the “privacy budget”
ϵ (BS). Standard composition results from the DP literature ensure
that BS meets ϵ-LDP [15]. However, in general, accuracy is im-
proved if we instead sample one out ofm pieces of information and
release this with ϵ-LDP [6], and this is confirmed by our analysis of
our protocols. In particular, if a user’s information is represented as
a binary vector of dimensionm, we can uniformly sample an index
j with probability ps = 1/m, and use Randomized Response with
parameter pr to release the value found there.
We often encounter cases where a user holds a sparse vector:
exactly one entry is 1, and the rest are 0. The random sampling
approach applied to the entries of the vector has the disadvantage
thatmost likelywewill sample a zero entry, limiting the information
revealed. We discuss two alternative approaches, which extend
randomized response in different ways.
Preferential Sampling (PS): The first extension of RR is a natural
generalization (aka Generalized Randomized Reponse [28], Direct
Encoding [41]), which we label Preferential Sampling. Given a
sparse vector t ∈ I2m×2m such that |t | = 1 and t[j] = 1, we sample
an index ℓ according to the following distribution:
ℓ =
{
j : t[j] = 1, with probability ps
j ′ : j ′ ∈R [m] \ {j}, with probability 1 − ps
In other words, we report the true index with probability ps , while
each incorrect index is reported with probability 1−psm−1 . Whenm = 2
this mechanism is equivalent to 1 bit randomized response. Consid-
ering these two output probabilities, we immediately have:
Fact 3.1. The output of preferential sampling meets LDP with
eϵ =
ps
1−ps ·m − 1.
Rearranging, we set ps = (1 + (m − 1)e−ϵ )−1 to obtain ϵ-LDP.
Parallel Randomized Response (PRR): A second approach is applym
independent instances of RR, each with parameter ϵ/2. We refer to
this as Parallel Randomized response (PRR) (also known as Basi-
cRAPPOR [18] and Unary Encoding [41]). Note that the output of
PRR is anm-bit string which is not guaranteed to be sparse.
Fact 3.2. Parallel Randomized Reponse applied to a sparse vector
t meets ϵ-LDP.
This fact follows by observing that for adjacent inputs ti and t ′i ,
and a particular output R in (2), the probabilities associated with all
but two output bit locations in R are identical (and so cancel in the
ratio Pr[F (ti ) = R]/Pr[F (t ′i )] = R). We are left with the probabilities
associated with the locations ji and j ′i (i.e. the locations 1 bits in the
two adjacent inputs). The probability ratio for each of these bits is
exp(ϵ/2) from ϵ2 -RR, so their product is exp(ϵ), as required by (2). In
recent work, Wang et al. [41] set the probability of keeping the sole
1 to be 12 , and the probability of retaining each 0 to be (1 + eϵ )−1,
to slightly improve the variance of this mechanism.
3.2 Marginal Tables
Notation and preliminaries. Recall that we model each user i’s
bit vector ti ∈ I2d×2d as a vertex in ad-dimensional Hamming cube.
Then we can restrict our attention only on a subset of k dimensions
of interest by summing (marginalizing) out cells of non-essential
dimensions. This is formally captured by the following definition.
Definition 3.2 (Marginal operator). Given a vector t ∈ R2d , the
marginal operator Cβ : R2d ⇒ R2k computes the summed fre-
quencies for all combinations of values of attributes encoded by
β ∈ {0, 1}d , where |β |, the number of 1s in β , is k ≤ d .
For example, for d = 4 and β = 0101 (which encodes our interest
in the second and the fourth attribute), the result of C0101(t) is
the projection of t on all possible combinations of the second and
fourth attributes with remaining attributes marginalized out. Each
of the 2k entries in the vector C0101(t) stores the total frequency
of combinations of the k attributes identified by β . We make use
of the ⪯ relation, defined as α ⪯ β iff α ∧ β = β . For convenience
of expression, we abuse notation and allow Cβ (t) to be indexed by
{0, 1}d rather than {0, 1}k , with the convention that entries α such
that α ⪯̸ β are 0. Under this indexing, the entries in a marginal can
be written in the following way:
∀γ ⪯ β Cβ (t)[γ ] = ∑η:η∧β=γ t[η] (3)
The condition η ∧ β = γ selects all indices η ∈ {0, 1}d whose value
on attributes encoded by β are γ .
Example 3.1. Let d = 4 and β = 0101. Then, applying (3):
C0101(t)[0000] = t[0000] + t[0010] + t[1000] + t[1010]
C0101(t)[0001] = t[0001] + t[0011] + t[1001] + t[1011]
C0101(t)[0100] = t[0100] + t[0110] + t[1100] + t[1110]
C0101(t)[0101] = t[0101] + t[0111] + t[1101] + t[1111]
All indices in {0, 1}d contribute exactly once to one entry in C0101.
Definition 3.3 (k-way marginals). We say that β identifies a k-
way marginal when |β | = k . For a fixed k , the set of all k-way
marginals correspond to all
(d
k
)
distinct ways of picking k attributes
from d . We refer to the set of full k-way marginals as encompassing
all j-way marginals sets, ∀j ≤ k .
Note that the (unique) d-way marginal corresponds to the com-
plete input distribution. Since a single user’s input ti is sparse i.e.
contains just a single 1 (say at index ji ), any marginal β of ti will
also be sparse with just one non-zero element. The relevant index
in Cβ (ti ) is given by the bitwise operation ji ∧ β .
Definition 3.4 (Marginal release problem). Given a set of N users,
our aim is to collect information (with an LDP guarantee) to allow
an approximation of any k-way marginal β of the full d-way dis-
tribution t =
∑N
i=1 ti/N . Let Ĉβ be the approximate answer. We
measure the quality of this in terms of the total variation distance
from the true answer Cβ (t), i.e.
1
2
∑
γ ⪯β |Ĉβ [γ ] − Cβ (t)[γ ]| = 12 ∥Ĉβ − Cβ (t)∥1
The marginals of contingency tables allow the study of interest-
ing correlations among attributes. Analysts are often interested in
marginals with relatively few attributes (known as low-dimensional
marginals). If we are only concerned with interactions of up to at
most k attributes, then it suffices to consider the k-way marginals,
rather than the full contingency table. Since during the data collec-
tion phase we do not know a priori which of the k-way marginals
may be of interest, our aggregation should gather enough infor-
mation from each user to evaluate the set of full k-way marginals
for some specified k . Our aim is to show that we can guarantee a
small total variation distance with at least constant probability1.
We will express our bounds on this error in terms of the relevant
parameters N , d , k , and the privacy parameter ϵ . To facilitate com-
parison, we give results using the O˜ notation which suppresses
factors logarithmic in these parameters.
Marginals andBasis Transforms. Since the inputs andmarginals
of individual users are sparse, the information within them is con-
centrated in a few locations. A useful tool to handle sparsity and
“spread out” the information contained in sparse vectors is to trans-
form them to a different orthonormal basis. There are many well-
known transformations which offer different properties, e.g Taylor
expansions, Fourier Transforms, Wavelets, Chebyshev polynomi-
als, etc. Among these, the discrete Fourier transformation over the
Boolean hypercube—known as the Hadamard transform—has many
attractive features for our setting.
Definition 3.5 (Hadamard Transformation (HT)). The transform
of vector t ∈ R2d is θ = ϕt where ϕ is the orthogonal, symmetric
2d × 2d matrix with ϕi, j = 2−d/2(−1)⟨i, j ⟩ .
Consequently, each row/column in ϕ consists of entries of the
form ± 12d/2 , where the sign is determined by the number of 1 bit
positions that i, j agree on, denoted as an inner-product ⟨i, j⟩. It
is straightforward to verify that any pair of rows ϕi ,ϕ j satisfy
⟨ϕi ,ϕ j ⟩ = 1 iff i = j , and the inner product is 0 otherwise. Hence ϕ
is an orthonormal basis for R2d . Given an arbitrary vector t , we say
that its representation under the HT is given by the 2d Hadamard
coefficients (denoted as θ ) in the vector θ = ϕt . These properties
of HT are well-known due to its role in the theory of Boolean
functions [35]. In our case when ti has only a single 1 (say at index
ℓ), the Hadamard transform of ti amounts to selecting the ℓth basis
vector of ϕ, and so θ j = ϕ j, ℓ . We rely on two elements to apply the
Hadamard transform in our setting. The first follows from the fact
that the transform is linear:
Lemma 3.6. ϕ(∑ni=1 ti/N ) = 1N ∑ni=1(ϕti )
That is, the Hadamard coefficients for the whole population are
formed as the sum of the coefficients from each individual. The
second ingredient due to Barak et al. [4] is that we can write any
marginal β ∈ C as a sum of only a few Hadamard coefficients.
Lemma 3.7 ([4]). Hadamard coefficients Hk = {θα : |α | ≤ k} are
sufficient to evaluate any k-way marginal β . Specifically,
Cβ (t)γ =
∑
α ⪯β
⟨ϕα , t⟩
∑
η:η∧β=γ
ϕα,η =
∑
α ⪯β
θα
( ∑
η:η∧β=γ
ϕα,η
)
(4)
1All our methods allow the probability of larger error to be made arbitrarily small.
Considering Example 3.1, to compute the marginal correspond-
ing to β = 0101, we just need the four Hadamard coefficients
indexed as θ0000,θ0001,θ0100 and θ0101. Moreover, to evaluate any 2-
way marginal from d = 4, we just need access to the
(4
0
)
+
(4
1
)
+
(4
2
)
=
11 coefficients whose indices have at most 2 non-zero bits, out of
the 24 = 16 total coeffcients.
4 PRIVATE MARGINAL RELEASE
We identify a number of different algorithmic design choices for
marginal release under LDP. By considering all combinations of
these choices, we reach a collection of six distinct baseline algo-
rithms, which we evaluate analytically and empirically, and identify
some clear overall preferred approaches from our subsequent study.
We describe our algorithms in terms of two dimensions:
View of the data. The first dimension is to ask what view the al-
gorithm takes of the data. We are interested in marginals, so one
approach is to project the data out into the set of marginals of in-
terest, and release statistics about those marginals. However, since
any marginal can be obtained from the full input distribution by
aggregation, it is also possible to work with the data in this form.
How the information is released. The canonical way to release data
under LDP is to apply Randomized Response. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1, when the user’s data is represented as a sparse input vector,
we can instantiate this by sampling a cell in their table, and applying
Randomized Response (the randomized response with sampling,
RRS, approach); by reporting a single cell index (via the preferential
sampling approach (PS)); or parallel randomized response (PRR)
to report information on the vector. The alternative approach we
study is to apply the Hadamard transform: the user’s table is now
represented by a collection of coefficients, each of which can take
on one of two possible values. We can then sample one Hadamard
coefficient, and report it via randomized response (we call this the
HT approach). Note that it is not meaningful to apply preferential
sampling or parallel RR after Hadamard transform, since the input
no longer meets the necessary sparsity assumption.
4.1 Accuracy Guarantees
In order to analyze our algorithms, we make use of bounds from
statistical analysis, in particular (simplified forms of) the Bernstein
and Hoeffding inequalities:
Definition 4.1 (Bernstein and Hoeffding inequalities). Given N
independent variables Xi such that E[Xi ] = 0, |Xi | < Mi , and
Var[Xi ] = σ 2 for all i . Then for any c > 0,
Pr
[ |∑Ni=1 Xi |
N > c
]
≤

2 exp(− Nc22σ 2+ 2c3 maxi Mi ) (Bernstein ineq.)
2 exp(− N 2c22∑Ni=1 M2i ) (Hoeffding ineq.)
These two bounds are quite similar, but Bernstein makes greater
use of the knowledge of the variable distributions, and leads to
stronger bounds for us when we can show σ 2 < M = maxi Mi .
Wewill show that our combination of techniques provides results
which are unbiased, accurate, and private to estimate a parameter
of the population f , such that 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, using N observations.
Constructing unbiased estimators. It is straightforward to de-
rive versions of the baseline operators (RRS, PS etc.) which are
unbiased – that is, we derive values such that simple summation
of these values provides a random value whose expectation is the
sum of the input values. For concreteness, we describe the process
for Preferential sampling to illustrate this step.
Recall that preferential sampling reports an index ℓ which is
claimed to be the location of the sole 1 in the given input table
of size 2k . For convenience, we write D = 2k − 1. Given the N
reports, let Fj be the fraction of times that j is reported, and let fj
be the true fraction of inputs that have a 1 at location j. Then the
expected reports of j come from the proportion of times the input
is j and it is correctly reported (ps fj ), plus the proportion of times
the input is not j but j is chosen to be reported ((1− fj ) 1−psD ). Thus
E[Fj ] = ps fj + (1 − ps ) 1−fjD
Rearranging this provides an unbiased estimator, fˆj =
DFj+ps−1
Dps+ps−1 .
Master Theorem for Accuracy. To analyze the quality of the
different algorithms, we provide a generalized analysis that can
be applied to several of our algorithms in turn. We assume that
each user input is in {−1, 1} in the proof, but we will also be able
to apply the theorem when inputs range over other values.
Theorem 4.2. Let each ti be a sparse vector where one entry is
{−1, 1}, and the rest are zero. When each user i uniformly samples an
input element j with probability ps and applies randomized response
with pr to construct t∗i , for c > 0 we have
Pr
[ |∑Ni=1 t∗i [j] − ti [j]|
N
≥ c
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2ps (2pr − 1)
2pr (2 1−pr2pr−1 + c3 )
)
Intuitively, this theorem lets us express the (total variation) error
in a marginal as a function of parameters ps and pr . We will choose
values of c that make this probability constant — this implies (for
example) that c should be chosen proportional to 1/√Nps . Hence,
we capture how the error decreases as N increases, and how it
increases as the number of items being sampled from increases. For
ease of reading, we defer all proofs to the Appendix.
4.2 Input Perturbation Based Methods
The three approaches which work directly on the input data require
a two-step analysis: first we consider the accuracy of reconstruction
of some global information (e.g. the full distribution), then we ana-
lyze the accuracy of aggregating this to give the required marginal
β . Throughout we assume that 2d is at least O˜(N ), i.e. the number
of users N participating is at least proportional to the number of
cells in the full distribution (2d ). This is natural, since it requires
our methods which sample cells from the full input to have at least
constant probability of probing any given cell. Now we spell out
the details of our input perturbation based algorithms. For all of
our algorithms, each user i uses the one-hot encoding for her input,
so ti ∈ I2d×2d .
Parallel Randomized Response On Input (InpRR). The most
direct application of LDP here is to add noise to all 2d locations.
Perturbation: Each user i perturbs their value ti at every index ℓ ∈
2d using ϵ2 -RR (PRR) to get t
∗
i ∈ Rd and sends it to the aggregator.
Aggregation:We reconstruct a version of the full input t∗ by sim-
ply unbiasing and summing all these contributions (and dividing
by N ); any desired marginal β is obtained by taking Cβ (t∗), i.e.
computing that marginal of the reconstructed input.
Algorithm 1 User’s routine for InpHT
1: procedure InpHT(ti )
2: Let ji ∈ {0, 1}d be the signal index of ti ∈ I2d×2d .
3: Randomly sample a coefficient index ℓi ∈ Hk .
4: θˆi ← RR(−1⟨ji , ℓi ⟩) ▷ Randomized response on (scaled) θℓi
5: Send (θˆi , ℓi )
Algorithm 2 Aggregator’s routine for InpHT
1: Θ∗[0] = 1 ▷ 0th Hadamard coefficient is always 1.
2: Aggregator fills table H from tuples (θˆi , ℓi ) as Hi [ℓi ] = θˆi .
3: for all j ∈ T do
4: Θ∗[j] ← 2−d
∑N
i=1 H
∗
i [j]/(2p−1)
Nj . ▷ Nj is the frequency count
of index j.
InpRR though simple, does not scale well with d as expected. It is
also potentially costly to apply, since each user needs to materialize
and communicate 2d pieces of information. Applying our general
analysis allows us to bound the error (total variation distance) in
the returned marginal.
Theorem 4.3. InpRR achieves ϵ-LDP and guarantees that
∥Cβ (t) − Cβ (t∗)∥1 = O˜
(
2(d+k )/2
ϵ
√
N
)
with constant probability.
Preferential Sampling On Input (InpPS). Our second method
uses preferential sampling to report a (noisy) index, so sends d bits.
Perturbation: Each user i samples the input signal index j with
probability ps , then reports the selected index to the aggregator.
Aggregation: The reconstructed distribution t∗ is found by apply-
ing the unbiasing to each noisy report (Section 4.1), and computing
the average. As in the previous case, we can obtain any desired
marginal by aggregating the reconstructed distribution.
Theorem 4.4. InpPS achieves ϵ-LDP and guarantees that with
constant probability we have for a target k-way marginal β
∥Cβ (t) − Cβ (t∗)∥1 = O˜
(
2d+k/2
ϵ
√
N
)
.
Consequently, we get a guarantee for InpPS in terms of total
variation distance of O˜
(
2k/22d
ϵ
√
N
)
. This exceeds the bound of the
previous algorithm by a factor of 2d/2, so we expect the former to
be more accurate in practice.
Random Sampling Over Hadamard Coefficients (InpHT). In
this method, user i takes the HT of her input and perturbs a uni-
formly sampled coefficient and releases it via Randomized Re-
sponse. According to Lemma 3.7, we do not need to sample from
all coefficients; we need only the set of coefficients T sufficient
to reconstruct the k-way marginals. T consists of those coeffi-
cients whose d-bit (binary) indices contain at most k 1’s. There
are |T | = ∑k
ℓ=1
(d
ℓ
)
= O(dk ) of these, which can be much smaller
than the 2d parameters needed to describe the full input.
Perturbation: Each i samples a coefficient index ℓi ∈ T uniformly
and computes a scaled-up version of the ℓi th Hadamard coefficient
θi as θi = (−1)⟨ji , ℓi ⟩ . She then perturbs θi with ϵ-RR as θˆi and
releases the tuple (ℓi , θˆi ).
Aggregation: The aggregator then unbiases, averages and rescales
each noisy coefficient θ j to estimate θˆ j . These can then be used to
reconstruct any target marginal β via the application of Lemma 3.7
to generate Cβ (t∗).
For completeness, Algorithms 1 and 2 spell out the transforma-
tions steps followed by user and aggregator in InpHT. Note that
the communication per user can be encoded using 1 bit to describe
the output of RR θˆi , plus at most d bits to specify ℓi , the sampled
coefficient. We apply Theorem 4.2 to this setting to bound the total
variation distance between true and reconstructed marginals.
Theorem 4.5. InpHT achieves ϵ-LDP, and with constant probabil-
ity we have for any target k-way marginal β
∥Cβ (t) − Cβ (t∗)∥1 = O˜
( (2d )k/2
ϵ
√
N
)
.
Comparing this to the previous results, we observe that the
dependence on 2k/2
/(ϵ√N ) is the same. However, our full anal-
ysis shows a dependence on
√
T in place of
√
2d . Recall that T =∑k
ℓ=1
(d
k
)
< 2d for k < d . For small values of k , this is much im-
proved. For example, for k = 2,
√
T < d in InpHT compared to a
2d/2 term for InpRR.
4.3 Marginal Perturbation Based Methods
Our next methods are the analogs of the Input perturbation meth-
ods, applied to a randomly sampled marginal rather than the full
input. For brevity, we omit the formal proofs of these results and
instead provide the necessary intuition, since they are mostly adap-
tations of the previous proofs.
RR On A RandomMarginal (MargRR). InMargRR, user i ma-
terializes a random marginal βi ∈ C, then perturbs it using PRR.
Perturbation: User i samples a random marginal βi ∈ C, and eval-
uates its 2k indices (Cβ (ti )) on her input. Note that Cβ (ti ) is also
sparse. The user then perturbs each index of Cβ (ti ) with ϵ2 -RR
(PRR) and sends the tuple ⟨Cβ (t∗i ), βi ⟩ to the aggregator.
Aggregation: The aggregator sums up the perturbed marginals
received from all users and unbiases them.
Analysis (outline). As with InpRR, it is immediate that the method
achieves ϵ-LDP, since each perturbed marginal index is specific to
the input, and is obtained via RR which is ϵ-LDP.We require at most
d bits to identify which marginal was chosen, plus 2k bits to encode
the user’s perturbed marginal. In terms of accuracy, the analysis
is also very similar to InpRR. The difference is that we are now
considering sampling from
(d
k
)
marginals, each of which contains
2k pieces of information. So where before we had a dependence
on 2d , the method now also depends on 1/ps =
(d
k
)
= O(dk ). Thus,
via Theorem 4.3, we obtain a bound on the error in each entry of
each marginal of O˜(
√
dk
/
ϵ
√
N ). Summing this over the 2k entries
in the marginal, we obtain a total error of O˜
(
2kdk/2
ϵ
√
N
)
.
PS On A Random Marginal (MargPS). As an alternative ap-
proach toMargRR, we can use preferential sampling (Section 3.1)
to perturb the sampled marginal. We can pick the entry in the
randomly sampled marginal which contains the 1 and apply prefer-
ential sampling on it. For small marginals (i.e. small k), this may be
effective. Otherwise the algorithm is similar toMargRR, and we
build all the required marginals by averaging together the (unbi-
ased) reported results from all participants.
Analysis. The behavior of this algorithm can be understood by
adapting the analysis of InpPS. Since we work directly with the
marginal of size k , we now obtain a bound in terms of 23k/2 where
before we had 2d+k/2. However, the effective population size is split
uniformly across the
(d
k
)
differentmarginals. Consequently, the total
variation distance is O˜
(
23k/2dk/2
ϵ
√
N
)
. This exceeds the previous result
by a factor of 2k/2, but for small k (such as k = 2 or k = 3), this can
be treated as a constant and the other factors hidden in the big-Oh
notation may determine the true behavior. The user sends d bits to
identify the sampled marginal, plus k bits to identify the sampled
index within it.
Hadamard Transform Of A Random Marginal (MargHT).
MargHT also deviates from MargRR only in how the chosen mar-
ginal is materialized: it takes the Hadamard transform of each user’s
sampled marginal, and uses RR to release information about a ran-
domly chosen coefficient. These are aggregated to obtain estimates
of the (full) transform for each k-way marginal β . Note that this
method does not share information between marginals, and so does
not obtain as strong a result as InpHT.
Analysis. Here, pr is the same as in InpHT, but we are now sam-
pling over a larger set of possible coefficients: each marginal re-
quires 2k coefficients to materialize, and we sample across T =
O(dk ) marginals. This sets ps = O((2d)−k ). We obtain that σ 2 =
O((2d)k/ϵ2) and M = O((2d)k/ϵ). Thus, we bound the absolute
error in each reconstructed coefficient by O˜
(
dk/2
ϵ
√
N
)
, by invoking
Theorem 4.2 with these values and then applying the rescaling by
2−k . We directly combine the 2k coefficients needed by marginal
β , giving total error O˜( 23k/2dk/2
ϵ
√
N
), similar to the previous case. The
communication cost is d bits to identify the marginal, and k + 1 bits
for the index of the Hadamard coefficient and its perturbed value.
Summary of marginal release methods. Although different in
form, all three marginal based methods achieve similar asymptotic
error, which we state formally as follows:
Lemma 4.6. Two marginal-based methods (MargPS andMargHT)
achieve ϵ-LDP and with constant probability the total variation dis-
tance between true and reconstructed k-way marginals is at most
O˜( 23k/2dk/2
ϵ
√
N
). For MargRR, the bound is O˜( 2kdk/2
ϵ
√
N
).
Comparison of all methods. Comparing all six methods, a de-
pendence on a factor of 2k/2ϵ
√
N is common to all. Marginal-based
methods multiply this by a factor of at least (2d)k/2, while input
based methods which directly materialize the full marginal (InpRR
and InpPS) have a factor of 2d . The input Hadamard approach In-
pHT reduces this to just dk/2. Asymptotically, we expect InpHT to
have the best performance. However, for the parameter regimes
we are interested in (e.g. k = 2), all these bounds could be close in
practice. Hence, we evaluate the methods empirically to augment
these bounds. The time cost of all methods is linear in the size of
the communication: each user’s time cost is proportional to the
size of the message sent, while the aggregator’s time is propor-
tional to the total size of all messages received, to simply sum up
derived quantities. Table 2 summarizes these bounds, showing the
Table 2: Summary of communication and error bounds.
Method Communication cost Error behavior
InpRR 2d 2k/22d
InpPS d 2k/22d
InpHT d + 1 2k/2dk
MargRR d + 2k 2kdk/2
MargPS d + k 23k/2dk/2
MargHT d + k + 1 23k/2dk/2
communication cost (in bits), along with the leading error behavior
(supressing logarithmic factors and the common factor of ϵ/√N ).
4.4 Expectation-Maximization Heuristic
While materialization of marginals has not been the primary focus
of prior work, a recent paper due to Fanti et al. does suggest an alter-
native approach for the 2-way marginal case [20]. The central idea
is for each user to materialize information on all d attributes, and
to use post-processing on the observed combinations of reported
values to reach an estimate for a given marginal.
In more detail, each user independently perturbs each of the d
(binary) attributes via (ϵ/d)-randomized response, i.e. using Bud-
get Sharing (BS). To reconstruct a target marginal distribution, the
aggregator applies an instance of Expectation Maximization (EM).
Starting from an initial guess (typically, the uniform marginal), the
aggregator updates the guess in a sequence of iterations. Each it-
eration first computes the posterior distribution given the current
guess, applying knowledge of the randomized response mechanism
(expectation step). It then marginalizes this posterior using the
observed values of combinations of values reported by each user,
to obtain an updated guess (maximization step). These steps are
repeated until the guess converges, which is then output as the
estimated distribution. As noted by Bassily and Smith [6], this is
a plausible heuristic, but does not provide any worst case guaran-
tees of accuracy. We compare this method, denoted InpEM, to the
algorithms above in our experimental study. In summary, we find
that the method provides lower accuracy than our new methods.
In particular, we see many examples where it fails: the EM proce-
dure immediately terminates after a single step and outputs the
prior (uniform) distribution.2. We compare InpEM with best of our
methods in Section 5.4.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have two goals for our empirical study: (1) to give experimental
confirmation of the accuracy bounds proved above; and (2) to show
that our algorithms support interesting machine learning/statistical
tasks using our marginal computing machinery as primitives. We
implement our methods with standard Python packages (Numpy,
Pandas) and perform tests on a standard Linux laptop.
We give our main experimental results on varying parameters N ,
k and d for our algorithms in this section. Additional experiments
on ϵ and alternative primitives are given in Appendix B.
2Figure 3 in the Appendix quantifies this in more detail, and shows some parameter
settings where the method fails universally.
Figure 3: Attribute correlation heatmap of NYC taxi data
5.1 Experimental Setting
Datasets used.We use two sample datasets for our experiments:
NYC Taxi Data [1]. This dataset samples trip records from all trips
completed in yellow taxis in NYC from 2013-16. Each trip record
can be viewed a unique anonymous rider’s response to a set of
survey questions about her journey. Some of the attributes are GPS
co-ordinates/timestamps of pick-up/drop-off, payment method, trip
distance, tip paid, toll paid, total fare etc. From this (very large) data
set, we select out the 3M records having pickup and/or drop-off
locations inside Manhattan. We obtain the 8 binary attributes for
each trip listed in Table 1. We observe in this dataset that most
journeys are short, and so attribute pairs such as pickup/drop-
off locations/times, tip-fraction and payment mode are strongly
correlated. Meanwhile, most other attribute pairs are negatively
correlated, or only weakly related. Figure 3 gives a heatmap for the
strength of pairwise associations using the Pearson coefficient.
Movielens [25]. This dataset comprises over 20M records from over
150K anonymous users who rate nearly 40K unique movie titles.
Each title belongs to one or more of 17 genres such as Action,
Comedy, Crime, Musical etc. From this, we derive a dataset to
encode “video viewing” preferences. We first find the top-1000
most rated movies in each genre. We assign each user a vector of
preferences ti ∈ {0, 1}d . For each user i , a bit at index j ∈ [d] is 1 if
i has rated at least one of the top 1000 movies of genre j and zero
otherwise. In this data, most attribute pairs are postively correlated.
Default ParametersAnd Settings. In each experimental instance,
we sample (with replacement) a set of random unique records/users
(50K ≤ N ≤ 0.5M) as a power of 2 from the total available popu-
lation. We vary ϵ from 0.2 (higher privacy) to 1.4 (lower privacy).
Note that the theory shows that ϵ and N are tightly related: decreas-
ing ϵ means N must be increased to obtain the same accuracy. Some
prior work on LDP e.g. [34] studies a smaller regime of ϵ values,
at the expense of a much larger user population. Our experiments
adopt the probability settings for Parallel Randomized Response
due to Wang et al. [41], although we find that these make little
difference compared to the “vanilla” Randomized Response prob-
abilities. We begin our experimental study by sampling (without
replacement) a small subset of dimensions d (3-8), and increase to
larger dimensionalities for our later experiments. Per our motiva-
tion (Section 1), we focus on small marginals (k = 1, 2, 3). We repeat
each marginal reconstruction 10 times to observe the consistency
in our results, and show error bars.
5.2 Impact of varying population size N
We aim to understand howmuch a privately reconstructedmarginal
Cβ (t∗) deviates from its non-private counterpart Cβ (t) when β is
drawn from the set of k-way marginals. First, we fix ϵ = 1.1 and
vary N for different choices of d,k . For our initial comparison, we
keep d’s moderate ({4, 8, 16}), as this suffices to distinguish the
methods which scale well from those that do not.
Experimental Setting. Figure 4 shows plots for total variation
distance in reconstruction of k-way marginals as we vary N for all
combinations of k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and d ∈ {4, 8, 16} on the movielens
dataset with ϵ = ln(3) ≈ 1.1 fixed throughout the experiment. Each
grid point shows the mean variational distance of all k = 1, 2, 3
marginals. The values of parameters d and k vary across the rows
and columns of the figure, respectively.
Experimental Observations. A high level observation across the
board is how the error reduces as N increases for all 6 algorithms.
This agrees with the analysis that error should be proportional to
1/√N , i.e. error halves as population quadruples. We also see an
increase in error along columns (rows) as k (d) increases, although
the dependency varies for different algorithms.
Our second observation is that the performance of InpPS decays
rapidly as a function of d , consistent with the accuracy bound of
2d . Typically, InpPS’s error does not reduce as with N . This is
because the probability of outputting the signal index becomes so
small for larger d’s that each user responds with a random index
most of the time. This means that the perturbed input distribution
does not contain much information for our estimators to invert
the added noise with precision. One surrogate for the accuracy
of the algorithms is the number of statistics materialized in each
case. For d = 8,k = 2, InpPS construct 28 = 256 values, while the
marginal-based methods are working on
(8
2
) × 2k = 112 values. As
a result, the number of data points per cell is proportionately more
forMargHT,MargPS thus improving their accuracy. On the other
hand, the input-based method InpHT convincingly achieves the
lowest (or near lowest) error across all parameter settings.
Breaking the algorithms down by the cardinality of the marginal
(k), note that for k = 1 then the primitives RR and PS are effectively
the same. Further, for a givenmarginal, there is only onemeaningful
Hadamard coefficient needed, and so we expect the Hadamard-
based methods to behave similarly. Indeed, the methodsMargPS,
MargRR,MargHT, and InpHT are largely indistinguishable in their
accuracy. For the larger 2-way and 3-way marginals, we see more
variation in behavior. The input-based methods do not fare well:
InpPS has very large errors for even smaller d values (d = 4 and
d = 8), and InpRR is similar once d = 16. We observe that MargPS
achieves better accuracy than MargRR. This supports the idea
that the former method, which preferentially reports the location
of each user’s input value, can do better than naive randomized
response, even though this is not apparent from the asymptotic
bounds. Interestingly, on this data we see that the difference in
performance of MargPS andMargHT is tiny, andMargPS turns
out to be a better algorithm. For d = 16, MargHT starts as a better
algorithm but is outperformed byMargPS.
InpRR is among the better methods for smaller values of d and
k’s. However, we advise against InpRR for large d’s since it takes
time proportional to 2d to perturb all cells of each user. Similarly,
Figure 4: Mean total variation distance for 1, 2, 3−way marginals over the movielens dataset as N varies
Figure 5: Effect of varying k .
the use of MargRR is also hard to justify from an execution time
standpoint when k gets larger, since it materializes the full marginal
and applies randomized response to each cell.
Across all experiments, we find that InpHT achieves the best
accuracy most consistently, and is very fast in practice.
5.3 Impact of increasing marginal size k
In this work, our main focus has been on relatively low order
marginals (k ≤ 3), as we find this setting most compelling. However,
our algorithms work for any k ≤ d . In this section, we allow k to
vary, and again measure accuracy on the taxi data set.
Experimental Setting: In this experiment, we set N = 218, eϵ =
3,d = 8 and vary k from 1 to 7 (Figure 5). Note that we expect to
see the strongest results for InpHT when k ≤ d2 ; as k approaches d ,
we require more Hadamard coefficients, and the theoretical bound
converges to that of the other input based methods.
Experimental Observations: We observe that, in line with ex-
pectations, InpHT is the method of choice for k ≤ d/2. For larger k ,
InpRR appears competitive in terms of accuracy. However, there are
some notable disadvantages to InpRR, as it carries with it a much
higher communication cost: the method has to send the whole
input distribution, rather than a single Hadmard index and value.
The aggregator’s work is consequently higher as well. This ratio
is 28 when d = 8, rising to nearly 4000 for d = 16. Other methods
become less accurate more quickly. The absolute error does start to
grow as k increases, even in the best case. However, note that a total
variation distance of 0.125 in a marginal with k = 5 corresponds to
an average absolute error of 0.125/32 ≈ 0.004 per entry.
5.4 Impact of increasing dimensionality d
Experimental Setting. Now that we have established the rela-
tive performance of our algorithms, we compare to an alterna-
tive method that works in the case k = 2, denoted InpEM (Sec-
tion 4.4). We consider a larger range of values of the dimensionality
Figure 6: Total variation distance for k = 2 on NYC Taxi Trips Data For larger d’s.
d , (achieved by duplicating columns) and show the results in Fig-
ure 6. For InpEM, we fix the convergence threshold to Ω = 0.00001,
i.e. stop when the change in the current guess is below Ω.
Experimental observations.We see that the InpEM gives reason-
able results that improve as ϵ is increased. However, the achieved
accuracy is several times worse than the unbiased estimators InpHT
andMargPS. There are additional reasons to not prefer InpEM: it
lacks any accuracy guarantee, and so is hard to predict results. It is
also slow to apply, taking several thousand or tens of thousands of
iterations to converge. In some cases, the convergance criteria are
immediately met by the uniform distribution, which is far from the
true marginal. We omit formal timing results for brevity; however,
convergence time was observed to grow linearly with d . Weakening
the convergence criterion (i.e. increasing the stopping parameter
Ω) even slightly led to much worse accuracy results than the al-
ternative methods. In contrast, our unbiased estimators are found
instantaneously.
Remark. It is reasonable to ask whether EM decoding schemes
can be developed for other methods for recovering marginals. We
performed a set of experiments on this approach (details omitted
for space reasons); our conclusion is that while this can be applied
to our algorithms, there is no improvement compared to the direct
construction of unbiased estimators.
6 APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Since each cell of a k-way marginal is a joint distribution of a set of
k attributes and can be used to determine conditional probabilities,
marginals are useful in machine learning and inference tasks. In
this section, following our motivational use case, we perform (1)
association testing among attributes (2) dependency trees fitting.
For both tasks, 1 and 2-way marginals are sufficient. Based on the
accuracy results, we useMargPS and InpHT for these tasks. Finally,
we discuss how to apply our results to non-binary attributes.
6.1 Association Testing
We often want to check if two variables A,B are independent or
not i.e. we want to know if Pr[A,B] ≈ Pr[A] Pr[B]. The χ2 test
of independence compares the observed cell counts to expected
counts assuming the independence (null hypothesis) and compute
the χ2 value (see e.g. [3]). It then compares this value to the critical
Figure 7: χ2 test values on N = 256K NYC taxi trips, ϵ = 1.1.
value p for a given confidence interval (usually 0.95). If χ2 > p, we
conclude that A,B are dependent (rejecting the null hypothesis).
For a 2-way marginalm, the χ2 statistic is
∑
j ∈{0,1}2
(t [j]−E[t [j]])2
E[t [j]] ,
where E[t[j]] is the expected value at t[j].
Experimental setting. We use the taxi data for supporting this
task since this dataset has a good mix of correlated/weakly corre-
lated attributes (Figure 3). As mentioned above, there are strong
positive associations in the taxi data among the pairs ⟨Night_pick,
Night_drop⟩, ⟨Toll, Far⟩ and ⟨CC, Tip⟩ and expect the test to de-
clare them as dependent. Similarly, we expect the test to declare
the pairs ⟨M_drop, CC⟩, ⟨Far, Night _pick⟩ and ⟨Toll, Night_pick⟩
to be independent.
Experimental observations. Figure 7 compares privately and
non-privately computed χ2 values with the critical value (computed
with 1 degree of freedom and with confidence interval of 95%3)
over log scale. We observe that non-private and private χ2 values
are quite close in most cases for InpHT (note the log scale on the
y-axis, which tends to exaggerate errors in small quantities). On the
other hand, MargPS often commits the type I error (thus failing
to reject the null hypothesis) for the pairs ⟨Toll, Night_pick⟩, ⟨Far,
Night_pick⟩ and occasionally for pairs ⟨M_drop , CC⟩, since the
test statistic is close to the critical value in these cases.
3Gaboardi et al. in [21] suggest increasing p since comparing a differentially private
χ 2 statistic to a noise unaware critical value may not lead to a good significance level
even for large N . We do not perform correction in this test, and leave developing
robust correlation tests under LDP for future work.
Figure 8: Total mutual information of trees on movielens
6.2 Bayesian Modeling
Exact estimation of a joint distribution for d discrete variables could
be computationally infeasible for large d’s. Chow and Liu in [9]
proposed an algorithm for approximating a joint distribution of a
set of discrete variables using products of distributions involving
no more than pairs of variables. Since each variable in the approxi-
mation depends on at most one more variable, the task of finding
such approximation can be thought as finding a tree that optimizes
a particular distance metric. They prove that a tree configuration
that maximizes total mutual information among edges is an optimal
approximation of the joint distribution in question. This insight
converts the intractable optimization problem of finding such tree
to an easy problem of finding a maximum weight spanning tree.
Concretely, all we have to do is treat all random variables as nodes
in an empty graph and find a tree that maximizes the total edge
weight. Once a tree is learnt, any high dimensional joint distribution
of interest can be learnt by multiplying conditional probabilities
that can found using marginals.
The center piece of this algorithm is computation of mutual
information between
(d
2
)
pairs of variables. Mutual information
between two discrete variables A,B ∈ {0, 1} is given as
MI (A,B) = ∑i, j ∈{0,1}2 Pr[A = i,B = j] log Pr[A=i,B=j]Pr[A=i] Pr[B=j]
Experimental setting. Note that the Chow-Liu algorithm finds a
tree from the equivalence class of trees fitting the given data and
are not unique. Moreover, there could be many others trees with
different topologies achieving near optimal MI score. Therefore,
our aim in this section is to compare total MI from privately and
non-privately learnt trees. For this purpose, we use the movielens
dataset with d = 10.
Experimental observations. Figure 8 compares the total (true)
MI from 200K users for various ϵ values (error bars show variation
over different subsets of sampled records). We once again see that
MI of trees computed with InpHT marginals is nearly the same as
the non-private computation. MargPS is less accurate at low ϵ’s
but catches up with InpHT as ϵ increases. We conclude that InpHT
gives a robust solution for this approach.
6.3 Categoric Attributes
We now consider how to apply these methods over more general
classes of input – in particular, over cases where the input is non-
binary, but ranges over a larger set of possible categories r > 2.
Suppose now we have d categoric attributes with cardinalities (in-
dexed in order of size for convenience) r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . ≥ rd , and
wish to find marginals involving subsets of at most k attributes. We
describe two approaches to handling such data.
Binary encoding methods using our algorithms.Many of our
algorithms suchMargRR,MargPS, InpPS, InpRR will generalize
easily in this case, since they can be applied to users represented as
sparse binary vectors. The Hadamard-based methodsMargHT and
InpHT can also be generalized if we rewrite the input in a binary
format, i.e. we create a fresh binary attribute for each possible cate-
goric value in an attribute (aka “one-hot encoding”). However, we
can more compactly encode an attribute value that takes on r possi-
ble values using ⌈log2 r⌉ bits, and consider this as the conjunction
of ⌈log2 r⌉ binary attributes. Consequently, we state a result (based
on our strongest algorithm for the binary case) in terms of the
effective binary dimension of the encoded data, d2 =
∑d
i=1 ⌈log2 ri ⌉;
and the binary dimension of k-way marginals k2 =
∑k
i=1 ⌈log2 ri ⌉:
Corollary 6.1. Using InpHT on binary encoded data, we achieve
ϵ-LDP, and with constant probability we have for any target k-way
marginal β on binary encoded data,
∥Cβ (t) −Cβ (t∗)∥1 = O˜
( (2d2)k2/2
ϵ
√
N
)
Consequently, this provides an effective solution, particularly
for data with low cardinality attributes. We can see the impact
of this encoding from our experiments on varying k (Figure 5).
Observe that total variation distance over data encoded into k2
binary attributes is equivalent to total variation distance on binary
data for a marginal of size k = k2 attributes. For example, the error
on a 2-waymarginal over attributes with four possible values would
look like that for a k = 4 attribute binary marginal (as in Figure 5).
Orthogonal Decomposition. It is natural to ask whether there
are alternative decompositions for categorical data which share
many of the properties of the Hadamard transform (orthogonal,
requiring few coefficients to reconstruct low-order marginals). One
such approach is the Efron-Stein decomposition [17] which is a gen-
eralization of Hadamard transform for non binary contingency
tables. Similar to HT, it is possible to extract a set of Efron-Stein co-
efficients necessary and sufficient to evaluate a full set of a k−way
marginals. One could then design an algorithm similar to InpHT
that adds noise to a random coefficient, allowing an unbiased es-
timate to be constructed by an aggregator. We conjecture that for
low order marginals, a scheme based on such decomposition will
be among the best solutions.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have provided algorithms and results for the central problem
of private release of marginal statistics on populations. Our main
conclusion is that methods based on Fourier (Hadamard) transfor-
mations of the input are effective for this task, and have strong
theoretical guarantees in terms of accuracy, communciation cost,
and speed. Although the technical analysis is somewhat involved,
the algorithms are quite simple to implement and so would be
suitable for inclusion in current LDP deployments in browsers
and mobile devices: it would require only small modifications to
RAPPOR or iOS to incorporate them.
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A DEFERRED PROOFS
In this appendix, we provide the detailed technical proofs for the
claimed privacy and accuracy properties of our algorithms.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We first consider the input of a single
user subject to randomized response, and obtain an unbiased es-
timate for their contribution to the population statistics. This lets
us combine the estimates from each user to compute an unbiased
estimate for the population, whose variance we analyze to bound
the overall error.
Let ti [j] ∈ {−1, 1} be i’s unknown true input at location j and
t∗i [j] be the unbiased estimate of ti [j]. First, we derive the values
we should ascribe to t∗ to ensure unbiasedness, i.e. E[t∗i [j]] = ti [j].
1. When j is sampled (with probability ps ) and ti [j] = 1, we set
t∗i [j] = x/ps with probability pr and t∗i [j] = y/ps otherwise.
2. When j is sampled (with probability ps ), and ti [j] = −1, we set
t∗i [j] = y/ps with probability pr and x/ps otherwise.
3. When j is not sampled, we implicitly set t∗i [j] = 0.
We can encode these conditions with linear equations:
prx + (1 − pr )y = −1 (5)
pry + (1 − pr )x = 1 (6)
Solving, we obtain x = 1(2pr−1) and y = −
1
(2pr−1) . As we require
pr >
1
2 , we have x > 0 and y = −x < 0. We now analyze the
(squared) error from using these parameters. Define a random vari-
able for the observed error as Yi [j] = t∗i [j] − ti [j]. Observe that
E[Yi [j]] is 0, and
|Yi [j]| ≤ 1
ps
(
1 + 12pr − 1
)
=
2pr
ps (2pr − 1) := M .
Furthermore, |Yi [j]| is symmetric whether ti [j] = 1 or −1. Then:
Var[Yi [j]] = E[Y 2i [j]]
=
prps
p2s
 1
2pr − 1 − 1
2 + (1 − pr )ps
p2s
1 + 12pr − 1 2 + (1 − ps )12
≤ pr
ps
(
2pr − 2
2pr − 1
)2
+
(1 − pr )
ps
(
2pr
2pr − 1
)2
+ (1 − ps )
=
4
ps (2pr − 1)2 (pr (1 − pr )
2 + (1 − pr )p2r ) + (1 − ps )
=
4pr (1 − pr )
ps (2pr − 1)2 + (1 − ps ) := σ
2. (7)
Nowwe consider the effect of aggregating N estimates of the j’th
population parameter. Using Bernstein’s inequality (Definition 4.1),
we can bound the probability of the error being large based on the
boundM on the absolute value of the Yi [j]’s.
Pr
[
|∑Ni=1 Yi [j] |
N ≥ c
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc22σ 2+ 2cM3
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc2
2( pr (1−pr )
ps (2pr −1)2 +1)+
2cpr
3ps (2pr −1)
)
= 2 exp
(
− Nc22pr
ps (2pr −1) (
2(1−pr )
(2pr −1)+
c
3 )+2
)
(8)
This provides us with the statement of the theorem. □
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Wefirst analyze the accuracywithwhich
each entry of the full marginal t[j] is reconstructed, then combine
these to obtain the overall result. Consider an arbitrary index j ∈ 2d ,
since InpRR is symmetric across all indices. To achieve ϵ-LDP, we set
pr =
eϵ/2
1+eϵ/2 , andps = 1. For the purpose of analysis only, we reduce
the problem so that we can apply Theorem 4.2, by applying a remap-
ping from {0, 1} to {−1, 1}: we replace ti [j] with t ′i [j] = 2ti [j] − 1.
Observe that the absolute error in reconstructing t ′i [j] is only a
constant factor of that in reconstructing t ′i [j]. Writing α = eϵ/2,
then we have the variance of the local errors Yi [j] = (ti [j] − t∗i [j])
is (substituting these values of pr and ps into (7)):
Var[Yi [j]] ≤ 4pr (1 − pr )(2pr − 1)2 + 1 − 1 = 4
( 11+α )(1 − 11+α )
( 21+α − 1)2
= 4
α
(1+α )2
( 1−α1+α )2
=
4α
(1 − α)2 =
4eϵ/2
(eϵ/2 − 1)2 .
The reconstruction of the full input distribution is t∗ = ∑Ni=1 t∗i /N .
We can make use of the inequalities 1
eϵ/2−1 ≤ 1ϵ and 1 < eϵ/2 < 4
for 0 < ϵ < 2 to bound the variance and substitute into (8).
Pr[|tj − t∗j | > c] ≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
2 · (4 8ϵ 2 ) + 2·8c3ϵ
)
Setting c to 9N−1/2 1ϵ
√
log 2d+1/δ bounds this probability to
2 exp
(
−
81 1ϵ 2 log 2
d+1/δ
32
ϵ 2 +
16
3
9
ϵ 2
√
2d log 2d+1/δ
N
)
<2 exp
(
− 81 log(2
d+1/δ )
32 + 48
)
≤ δ/2d
This ensures that this error probability is less than δ/2d for any
index j. This limits the error in each of the 2d estimates to being
O˜( 1ϵ
√
1
N ), by applying a union bound.
We construct the target marginal β via the marginal operator,
so Ĉβ = Cβ (t∗). Each entry t∗[j] is an unbiased estimator for t[j]
whose absolute value is bounded by c with probability 1−δ . Condi-
tioning on this event, we compute Ĉβ [γ ] = ∑α ⪯γ t∗[α], summing
over the 2d−k values of α ⪯ γ . The error in this quantity is then
at most O˜(c
√
2d−k ), applying a Hoeffding bound (Definition 4.1).
Finally, summing the absolute errors over all 2k entries γ in the
target marginal β , we have probability at least 1 − δ that the total
variation distance is O˜( 2k 2(d−k )/2
ϵ
√
N
) = O˜( 2(d+k )/2
ϵ
√
N
). □
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Similar to Theorem 4.2, we define ran-
dom variables Yi [j] which describe the error in the estimate from
user i at position j. The proof is a bit more complicated here, since
these variables are not symmetric. Consider user i who samples a
location under PS, such that the correct location is sampled with
probability ps , and each of the D = 2d − 1 incorrect locations is
sampled with probability (1 − ps )/D. Following the analysis in Sec-
tion 4.1, we report D+ps−1Dps+ps−1 for the location which is sampled, and
ps−1
Dps+ps−1 for those which are not sampled. For convenience, define
the quantity ∆ = Dps + ps − 1. The choice of ps (which depends
on D and ϵ) ensures that ∆ > 0. There are two cases that arise:
(i) ti [j] = 1. With probability ps , location j is sampled. The contri-
bution to the error at this location is
D+ps−1
∆ − 1 = 1∆ (D + ps − 1 − Dps − ps + 1) = D∆ (1 − ps ).
Else, with probability 1 − ps , j is not sampled, generating error
ps−1
∆ − 1 =
ps−1−Dps−ps+1
∆ =
D
∆ ps for |t∗i [j] = ti [j]|.
(ii) ti [j] = 0. With probability 1−psD , we sample this j, giving error
D+ps−1
∆ − 0. Otherwise, the contribution to the error is
ps−1
∆ .
We define a random variable Yi [j], which is the error resulting
from user i in their estimate of ti [j]. Note that an upper boundM
on Yi [j] is D/∆. We compute bounds on Y 2i , conditioned on ti [j].
E[Yi [j]2 |ti [j] =1] = ps
(D
∆
(1 − ps )
)2
+ (1 − ps )
(
ps
D
∆
)2
= ps (1 − ps )
(D
∆
)2 ≤ (1 − ps )D2
∆2
E[Yi [j]2 |ti [j] =0] = 1 − ps
D
(
D + ps − 1
∆
)2
+
(
1 − 1 − ps
D
) (
ps − 1
∆
)2
=
1 − ps
∆2
(
1
D
(D + ps − 1)2 + D + ps − 1
D
(1 − ps )
)
=
1 − ps
D∆2
(D + ps − 1)(D + ps − 1 + 1 − ps )
= (1 − ps )(D + ps − 1)/∆2 ≤ (1 − ps )D/∆2
To bound the error in t∗[j], wemake use of the (unknown) param-
eter fj , the proportion of users for whom ti [j] = 1. We subsequently
remove the dependence on this quantity. We now write
E[Yi [j]2] ≤ (1 − ps ) D
∆2
(fjD + (1 − fj )) := σ 2j
Using this in the Bernstein inequality (Definition 4.1), we obtain
Pr
[
|∑Ni=1 Yi [j] |
N ≥c j
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−Nc2j
/ (
2σ 2j +
2c jM
3
))
= 2 exp ©­«−
Nc2j
2(1 − ps ) D∆2 (fjD + (1 − fj )) +
2c jD
3∆
ª®¬
If we write Ψj =
√
fjD + 1 − fj , then setting c j =
√
3D ln(2/δ )
∆
√
N
Ψj is
sufficient to ensure that this probability is at most δ .When we apply
the marginal operator Cβ to the reconstructed input t∗, each of the
2k entries is formed by summing up (D + 1)/2k (unbiased) entries
of t∗. Write f ′γ =
∑
j∧β=γ fj , and define Ψ′γ correspondingly as√
f ′γ (D − 1) + D+12k . Applying the Hoeffding bound (Definition 4.1),
we obtain that each Cβ (t∗)[γ ] has error at most
√
3D ln(2/δ )
∆
√
N
Ψ′γ with
probability at least 1 − δ .
We can now sum the error across all (D + 1)/2k indices γ . First,∑
γ ⪯β
ψ ′γ =
∑
γ ⪯β
(f ′γ (D − 1) +
D + 1
2k
) 12
≤
√
2k
( ∑
γ ⪯β
f ′γ (D − 1) +
D + 1
2k
) 1
2
=
√
2k+1 · D
where the inequality is due to Cauchy-Schwarz, and we use that
the f ′γ s are a probability distribution, and sum to 1. Then we have a
bound on the total variational error error of marginal construction
by summing over all indices γ as∑
γ ⪯β
c ′γ
2 =
1
2∆
√
D
N
√
3 ln 2/δ
∑
γ ⪯β
Ψ′γ ≤
2k/2D
∆
√
N
√
3
2 ln 2/δ
We next simplify the term D/∆ as follows. Recall that theory sets
ps = (1 + De−ϵ )−1. Then
D
∆
=
D
(D + 1)/(1 + De−ϵ ) − 1 =
D(1 + De−ϵ )
D + 1 − 1 − De−ϵ
=
1 + De−ϵ
1 − e−ϵ =
1
1 − e−ϵ +
D
eϵ − 1
When D is very small, in particular when D = 1, this reduces
to a similar error as for the RR case. Assuming that ϵ is at most a
constant (say, 8), we can upper bound this expression by O(D+1ϵ ).
Hence, the total variational error is bounded by O˜( 2k/2(D+1)
ϵ
√
N
). □
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The proof proceeds along the same lines
as for Theorem 4.3. We set pr = eϵ /(1 + eϵ ) to ensure that InpHT
meets ϵ-LDP. Recall that, from Lemma 3.6, our aim is to compute
Hadamard coefficients as the normalized sum of the coefficients
from each user. To apply the Master theorem (Theorem 4.2), we first
multiply up each coefficient by the 2d/2 factor from the Hadamard
coefficients θ (Definition 3.5). Since each user’s input vector has
only a single 1 entry, this ensures that each θi [j] is either −1 or +1.
Now the θi and θ∗i s represent theT necessary and sufficient (scaled
up) Hadamard coefficients, and so we set ps = 1/T . We write the
Table 3: Failure rate for InpEM on taxi dataset for small ϵ
.
N d k ϵ Failed/Total Marginals
216 8 1 0.2 3/8
218 8 2 0.1 15/28
216 8 2 0.2 3/28
216 12 2 0.2 19/66
218 16 2 0.1 120/120
218 16 2 0.2 72/120
219 24 2 0.2 276/276
variance of the errors in these estimates Yi [j], and obtain
Var[Yi [j]] = 4T pr (1 − pr )(2pr − 1)2 + 1 =
4Teϵ
(eϵ − 1)2 + 1 = O(T /ϵ
2)
Substituting this variance bound into (8), we obtain
Pr
[ |∑Ni=1 Yi [j] |
N ≥ c
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc2
O (T /ϵ 2+Tcϵ )
)
Setting c proportional to N−1/2 1ϵ
√
T · logT /δ ensures that this
probability is at most δ/T for any given Hadamard coefficient j
(again using that N is large enough). This bound then holds for all
T with probability 1 − δ , using the union bound.
In order to translate this into a bound on the accuracy of recon-
structing a marginal, we make use of Lemma 3.7, that the marginal
can be expressed in terms of a linear sum of Hadamard coefficients.
Adapting (4), we have that∑
γ ⪯β
|Cβ [γ ] − Ĉβ [γ ]| ≤
∑
γ ⪯β
 ∑
α ⪯β
(θα − θˆα )
∑
η∧β=γ
ϕα,η

To bound this quantity, we observe that:
(i) There are 2k such γ ⪯ β to consider.
(ii) There are similarly 2k such α to consider, and the above analysis
bounds (θα − θˆα ) ≤ c/2d/2, once we rescale the coefficients back
down. Since the θˆα are unbiased estimators bounded by c2−d/2, by
the Hoeffding inequality, we have that the sum of 2k of these is at
most 2k/2−d/2c with probability at least 1 − δ .
(iii) Given γ ⪯ β , there are 2d−k such η to consider, and so we have
|∑η∧β=γ ϕα,η | ≤ 2d−k2−d/2 = 2d/2−k .
Then the total variational error is (multiplying these three quan-
tities together) 2k2k/2−d/2c2d/2−k = c2k/2 = O˜
(
2k/2
√
T
ϵ
√
N
)
. □
B ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we provide additional experimental insight and
comparison. Table 3 shows experiments using the method of Fanti
et al. [20]. We then consider the impact of varying ϵ , and some
additional comparisons with “frequency oracles”.
B.1 Impact of privacy parameter ϵ
Experimental Setting.We fix N to 218 ≈ 0.25M movielens users
(sampled with replacement) and change ϵ . We increase d (resp., k)
along columns (rows) and vary 0.4 ≤ ϵ ≤ 1.4 to see the effect on
utility in Figure 9.
Observations: We observe a decline in error as we increase the
privacy budget ϵ . Once again we see that InpPS, InpRR,MargRR
Figure 9: Mean total variation for 1, 2, 3−way marginals for
N = 256K movielens users as ϵ varies.
are unfavorable for k ≥ 2. MargPS’s accuracy gets better than
MargHT with increase in ϵ , although MargHT is preferable to
MargPS for small ϵ values when d and k are larger. Yet again,
InpHT consistently outperforms all other algorithms across all
configurations. The main takeaway from these experiments is the
confirmation that the algorithms with the best theoretical bounds
on performance are borne out to be the best in practice. In general,
InpHT is our first preference followed byMargPS andMargHT.
B.2 Frequency Oracle Methods
As discussed in Section 2, there have been several recent papers
addressing the problem of estimating population frequencies under
LDP [2, 5, 41]. These works provide a “frequency oracle”: an LDP
protocol which allows the frequency of any element from a large
domain to be estimated accurately. A generic approach to marginal
materialization is to build a frequency oracle, and estimate marginal
probabilities by aggregating the estimated frequencies over the 2d
items from the original domain. In this section, we describe and
compare some representative instances of this generic approach.
A key consideration of frequency oracle design is to ensure that
the message sent by each user is small, compared to a possibly
massive domain size. The following two approaches achieve this
by hashing the input items onto a smaller domain, and applying
LDP primitives to reveal information about the hashed values.
Optimized Local Hashing (InpOLH) [41]: The OLH primitive
satisfying ϵ−LDP proposed by Wang et al. handles large domain
size via universal hash functions. In summary, each user i ∈ [N ]
with a sparse input ti ∈ I2m×2m uniformly samples a hash function
hi from a familyH : [2m ] → [1 + eϵ ] of universal hash functions
and hashes the signal index ji usinghi . User i releaseshi and a noisy
index j ′i perturbed using PS. For each user report, the aggregator has
to determine the probability that the response could have come from
Figure 10: Effect of varying d with frequency oracles
each input value in turn, and update their beliefs accordingly. Thus,
the communication cost is reduced toO(ϵ) bits, but the aggregator’s
time cost is O(2d ) per user.
Private Hadamard Count-Min Sketch (InpHTCMS) [10]: The
method deployed by Apple adapts ideas from sketching, and is also
similar to a related method [5]. In InpHTCMS, a sketch data struc-
ture is defined with д hash functions each drawn from a family of
3−wise independent hash functions mapping an input ji ∈ [m] to
a much smaller domainw . User i with a sparse input ti ∈ I2m×2m
uniformly picks one of the д hash function to apply to their in-
put, and releases a randomly sampled Hadamard coefficient of the
hashed input, using randomized response. The aggregator unbi-
ases the user reports, and uses them to reconstruct a sketch, which
can be used as a frequency oracle with standard sketch estimation
methods. Note that here the Hadamard transform is used to reduce
the size of the communication, at the expense of a slight increase
in error, in contrast to our results which use Hadmard to reduce
both error and communication cost.
Experimental Setting:We set eϵ = 3, so InpOLH hashes onto 4
possibilities. In InpHTCMS, we use д = 5 hash functions each of
widthw = 256 as this minimized the error observed in practice.
Experimental Observations: We applied our methods to syn-
thetic (lightly skewed) data, and again measured total variation
distance of the reconstructed marginals as we varied the dimension
d (Figure 10). For small d , the InpOLH scheme is promising, and ob-
tains accuracy equivalent to InpHT. However, the decoding scheme
is very slow in practice, requiring the aggregator to perform a sep-
arate enumeration of the base domain for each user’s response. We
timed out our methods after 12 hours of computation, and so results
are absent for InpOLH for the relatively small d = 12 and d = 16.
While InpHTCMS is designed to accurately recover heavy hitter
items (with large frequencies), it is not tuned for low-frequency
items, and so is not competitive in terms of accuracy, although it
is fast. Results were better when the input distribution was more
skewed (results not shown). We conclude that InpHT remains the
method of choice for marginal materialization under LDP.
